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INTRODUCTION
Most Americans do not know what asset forfeiture is, nor have even
heard of the concept. Few know that there is a special Department of
Justice unit devoted to developing asset forfeiture policy, there is an asset
forfeiture officer or unit in every United States Attorney's Office in the
country, or that asset forfeiture is an important duty for many federal law
enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
t J.D., Cornell Law School, 2005; BA Hollins University, 2002.
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Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Immigration Affairs
(formerly known as Immigration and Naturalization Services), and the
United States Marshal's Service. Information about asset forfeiture
rarely trickles down to the public; to the extent that it does, the public is
usually unaware of it. Each time the government seizes large amounts of
money from drug dealers is one example of the early steps of asset
forfeiture.
Asset forfeiture is the process by which the government seizes and
takes ownership of real and personal property that an individual unlaw-
fully obtained. Law enforcement employs this tool against individual
criminals as well as organized crime syndicates. There are a number of
federal statutes that govern the practice of asset forfeiture-one of the
most famous is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). I Asset forfeiture, thanks to RICO and other federal statutes, has
become an effective tool in combating crime. However, asset forfeiture
has been more difficult to apply overseas, especially against the activities
of internationally-based organized crime groups.
Following the tragedy of September 11, 2001, Congress promul-
gated another well-known set of statutes dedicated to controlling crime.
These laws were entitled "Uniting and Strengthening America by Provid-
ing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,"
more commonly known as the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act).2 The
Patriot Act was designed specifically to target terrorist groups, both do-
mestic and international, and it also contains numerous provisions relat-
ing to asset forfeiture.
One area of organized crime that has proved particularly difficult to
enforce has been international organized crime, such as money launder-
ing and drug trafficking. In considering whether the Patriot Act's asset
forfeiture provisions will be more effective than the old asset forfeiture
statutes to combat international organized crime, one should examine
several issues. This note will first discuss the prior state of domestic and
international asset forfeiture law, specifically as it applies to three main
areas of international crime-drug trade, organized crime, and money
laundering-and the problems and issues that arise in enforcing interna-
tional asset forfeiture. Then, this note will examine how the Patriot Act
changes asset forfeiture law and to which crimes the Patriot Act asset
forfeiture provisions apply. Finally, this note will analyze the legal and
practical problems with the new asset forfeiture provisions to explain
why the Patriot Act, although making some useful changes to law en-
forcement of asset forfeiture, fails to substantially improve the govern-
ment's ability to combat international organized crime syndicates.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
2 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302, 115 Stat. 272, 296-98 (2001).
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Before addressing these complicated questions, it will be beneficial to
first engage in a general discussion of asset forfeiture law, focusing par-
ticularly on its history, evolution, and policy goals.
I. BACKGROUND
Asset forfeiture is a process by which the government takes posses-
sion of property that was connected with criminal activity. The roots of
modem asset forfeiture lay in English common law, which allowed for
three different kinds of forfeiture: deodand, felony conviction, and statu-
tory forfeitures. 3 The deodand is a traditional form of forfeiture men-
tioned in the Bible and stretching back to ancient Greek and Roman
times.4 Under English common law, a piece of property or chattel that
caused a person's death went to the Crown.5
Forfeiture under English common law could also result from a con-
viction for felony or treason.6 If a person was convicted of treason, he
forfeited all his real and personal property to the Crown.7 On the other
hand, if a person was convicted of a felony, he forfeited his personal
property to the Crown, but his land escheated back to his lord.
8
The remaining type of forfeiture under English history is forfeiture
pursuant to specific statutes. Most of the forfeiture statutes were part of
the Navigation Acts of 1600 or the various laws designed to regulate
mercantile traffic.9 It is important to note a historic nexus requirement: It
was necessary for the state to prove a connection between either the
crime or the person, and the asset to be forfeited.
Deodand forfeiture was never practiced in America. 10 The earliest
American forfeiture practices were similar to the British Navigation
Acts, under statutes allowing forfeiture of ships engaging in piracy,
smuggling, and other maritime offenses in an effort to police trade."
Other early American forfeiture practices concerned customs, aiding
the rebellion, and "Prohibition" era forfeitures.' 2 Customs forfeitures
happened when the government forfeited goods on which duties had not
been paid. 13 During the Civil War, Congress passed legislation allowing
3 JIMMY GURULA & SANDRA GUERRA, THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE 3 (1998).
4 Id. at 4 (citing 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 10 (1881); Jacob J. Finkelstein, The
Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the
Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 180 (1973)).
5 GURULA & GUERRA, supra note 3, at 5 (citing HOLMES, supra note 4, at 9).
6 Id. at 9 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 132 n.12 (1861)).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 10 (citing MAGNA CARTA, 1215 ch. 22; 9 Hen. 3, ch. 22 (1225).
9 Id. at 10.
10 Id. at 11.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 14-17.
13 Id. at 14.
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the government to forfeit property used to support the rebellion and later
mandated the forfeiture of all property belonging to high-ranking offi-
cials of the Confederacy.14 During the Prohibition, the government for-
feited distilleries in which intoxicating liquors were made' 5 and
conveyances to transport such liquors.' 6 Modem American asset forfei-
ture law since the 1970's has been geared towards controlling the illegal
narcotics trade.17 The traditional nexus requirement appears here as
well-the state must prove a distinct connection between a criminal or
crime-piracy, rebellion, bootlegging, etc.-and the asset to be forfeited.
Today, the government can enforce asset forfeiture by local, state,
or federal law enforcement agencies. 18 Typically, the asset forfeiture
process begins during a law enforcement investigation when officers ini-
tially identify those assets which may be subject to forfeiture.19 At a
later point, often in conjunction with, or shortly after an arrest, law en-
forcement agents seize those assets, be it bank accounts, cash, cars, or
houses. 20 The law enforcement officers can take possession of either real
or personal property.21 For example, if the police arrest someone who
has been selling drugs out of his car, they may seize the car. If the law
enforcement officers can prove that the drug dealer deposited his pro-
ceeds into a particular bank account, then the officers may seize the
money as well. If law enforcement authorities can track the proceeds
from illegal activities, like drug dealing, then law enforcement may also
confiscate anything that was purchased with those proceeds, such as the
house or car that a drug dealer buys with the proceeds from his illegal
drug transactions. 22
A particular agency, like the U.S. Marshal's Service in the case of
federal forfeitures, is responsible for holding a defendant's confiscated
assets during trial.23 After trial, if the defendant is acquitted, then the
assets are returned to him. If the defendant is convicted and there is
sufficient proof to indicate that the seized assets were either used or pur-
chased in conjunction with the criminal activities, then the court will
issue an order of forfeiture. Subsequently, ownership interest in the as-
14 Id. at 15.
15 Id. at 16.
16 Id. (citing United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890) and Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436 (1885)).
17 See id. at 19-20 (citing United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993));
United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
18 See id. at 26-27.
19 MARY B. TROLAND, I AssET FORFEITURE: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 29 (1986).
20 See id. at 10-24.
21 See id.
22 GURUL & GuaiRRA, supra note 3, at 20.
23 TROLAND, supra note 19, at 204.
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sets shifts to the government. Orders of forfeiture can be administrative,
civil, or criminal.24
Asset forfeiture becomes complicated when multiple jurisdictions
must work together. Seizure may require the cooperation of multiple
domestic jurisdictional authorities and international law enforcement.
25
Beginning with the inception of the Drug Enforcement Administration
State and Local Task Forces in 1973, the federal government created a
number of programs aimed at fostering multi-jurisdictional domestic co-
operation in the drug war.26 These programs have been fairly successful
in streamlining the asset forfeiture process by making it easier to transfer
seized assets from the criminal defendants to the federal, state, or local
law enforcement agencies.
27
Cooperation among international law enforcement agencies to util-
ize asset forfeiture against the drug trade has also improved over the last
few decades thanks to the proactive efforts of the U.S. government and
other authorities. 28 The United Nations (U.N.) took a progressive step in
1988 with the Vienna Convention, when the U.N. provided worldwide
model rules for asset forfeiture.29 Subsequently, as many as thirty-four
Western democracies have entered into multilateral and/or bilateral
agreements to facilitate international cooperation in asset forfeiture.
30 In
addition to participating in these agreements, the United States allows
foreign governments who cooperate with asset forfeiture goals to join in
equitable sharing of the proceeds. Despite these advances, international
cooperation remains a difficult and elusive goal.
The modern American asset forfeiture scheme has several policy
goals. The primary goal is to deter crime through the imposition of se-
vere economic penalties since profit in crime is "the force that sustains
criminal enterprise."' 31 Another important goal is victim restitution,
which is achieved by distributing forfeited assets among the innocent
victims of the crimes having led to the forfeiture. Sometimes the govern-
ment, in the absence of such victims, is able to keep the forfeited assets
and use them to further future law enforcement activities. Occasionally,
the government will donate real property to charitable organizations.
32
24 See id. at 2, 43.
25 GURUL9 & GUERRA, supra note 3, at 26.
26 Id. (citing JAN CHAIKEN ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MULTUURISDICTIONAL DRUG
LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: REDUCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND (1990)).
27 Id. at 28-29.
28 Id. at 31.
29 Id. at 32 (citing OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE
PREs., REPORT TO CONGRESS (VOL. 1) (Sept. 1997)).
30 Id.
31 TROLAND, supra note 19, at Preface.
32 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MAN-
UAL ch. 10 (1998) (discussing disposition of forfeited property).
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Such donations almost always carry a requirement that the land be used
for some purpose that benefits the community, such as an after-school
center for children or a drug or alcohol rehabilitation center. 33
II. DISCUSSION
A. ASSET FORFEITURE LAW PRIOR TO THE PATRIOT ACT
Although the government uses asset forfeiture against a multitude of
criminals, this note will primarily discuss how asset forfeiture is used
against large, highly structured, and widespread criminal organizations
that engage in activities such as drug trafficking, racketeering, and
money laundering. There are both criminal and civil forfeiture statutes in
this area and the primary difference is the standard of proof to forfeit the
asset.34 For the government to proceed with a civil forfeiture, it need
only show probable cause that the property was involved in a criminal
offense.35
1. Drug Trafficking
Although there are hundreds of federal criminal and civil asset for-
feiture statutes, only two deal directly with the drug trade. Title 21,
U.S.C. § 881 is the federal statute authorizing civil forfeiture for viola-
tions of federal drug laws, and 21 U.S.C. § 853 is the federal statute
authorizing criminal forfeiture for violations of federal drug laws. Addi-
tionally, there are also pertinent statutes and laws governing international
asset forfeiture for drug-related offenses. 36
Section 881 is somewhat far-reaching in that it includes money and
other assets that were intended to be used in illegal drug transactions, not
just those assets that were actually used in such transactions. This is a
disturbing relaxation of the traditional nexus requirement. Historically,
the state had to prove that the car was actually used in a drug transaction
in order to seize it, but under § 881, the government need only say some-
one intended to use the car for a crime.37 Consider the ramifications: a
drug dealer might plan on stealing a car and then selling drugs. The
government could, under this relaxed nexus requirement, confiscate the
car on the grounds that the dealer intended to use it in an illegal drug
33 Id.
34 See GURULt & GUERRA, supra note 3, at 21.
35 See Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of Terrorism
and its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philan-
thropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341, 1392 (2004).
36 GURULI & GUERRA, supra note 3, at 312-47.
37 See also id. at 424-30.
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transaction. The rightful owner might lose his car even though he was
completely innocent.38
In addition to these civil forfeitures, there is also 21 U.S.C. § 853
for criminal forfeitures. Section 853 divides assets subject to criminal
forfeiture into three categories: any real or personal property constituting
proceeds from an illegal transaction; any real or personal property used
or intended to be used to commit or facilitate an illegal transaction; or
any interest in or property right over a continuing criminal enterprise as
defined by 21 U.S.C. § 848. There is, as with civil forfeiture, a nexus
requirement for assets used or intended to be used in facilitating an ille-
gal drug transaction. However, the statute "shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes, ' 39 and the courts almost uniformly
interpret the nexus requirement liberally.
40
There are additional pertinent provisions relating to the law of inter-
national asset forfeiture. In 1988, the United Nations under the 1988
Vienna Convention included international asset forfeiture provisions in
multilateral and bilateral treaties. 4 ' Each country that signs the agree-
ment must promulgate legislation that allows for the forfeiture of instru-
mentalities used in association with narcotics and psychotrophic
substances, as well as proceeds from the sale of such substances. 42 The
signatories to the treaties must also offer assistance upon request to other
countries in tracing and confiscating drug assets.43 In addition, there are
a number of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties in place, in which coun-
tries pledge with other individual states to assist each other in a number
of criminal matters including forfeiture. The United States is a party to
several such treaties.
A handful of United States statutes attempt to expand the nation's
reach in pursuit of forfeiture outside of U.S. borders. For example, 18
U.S.C. § 981 authorizes forfeiture of foreign drug-related assets that are
found in the United States, i.e., proceeds or instrumentalities from illegal
transactions that occurred in foreign countries, which are found in the
38 An innocent owner, whose possessions the government seized, may petition the gov-
ernment to have the property returned but asserting the "innocent owner" defense is an elabo-
rate and time-consuming process. Id. at 255-56.
39 21 U.S.C. § 853(o).
40 See United States v. Lewis, 987 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the vehicle
from which the defendant used a cellular phone to obtain cocaine price estimates was used in
an illegal drug transaction and thus the vehicle was subject to forfeiture). Cf Onwubiko v.
United States, 969 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the government failed to establish
probable cause that the $2,483 in cash found on person transporting heroin in balloons in
stomach facilitated a drug crime).
41 See United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traf-
fic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/13 (1988).
42 See id. at art. 5(4)(b).
43 Id. at art. 7(2).
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U.S.44 However, as one might imagine, such statutes are difficult to en-
force abroad without the cooperation of other foreign governments.
2. Organized Crime
Statutes geared at controlling organized crime are collected together
in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. These sections comprise the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which was passed in
1970 and includes asset forfeiture provisions. 45 Unlike the asset forfei-
ture statutes controlling drug trafficking, which allow asset forfeiture as
both a civil and a criminal penalty, asset forfeiture under RICO is a crim-
inal penalty only.46
Section 1963 of Title 18 provides for asset forfeiture of three cate-
gories of assets as a criminal penalty for violations of Section 1962: The
first is "any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962," which details a list of racketeering crimes. 47 The second
category is "any interest in... any enterprise which the person has estab-
lished . . . or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
1962."'48 The third category is "any property constituting... any pro-
ceeds which the person obtained ... from racketeering activity or unlaw-
ful debt collection in violation of section 1962.''49 The property subject
to forfeiture for RICO violations includes both real property, and tangi-
ble and intangible personal property. 50
Section 1963 maintains the traditional nexus requirement in two
ways. The three categories of forfeitable assets show that the govern-
ment may only forfeit assets that are tied directly to the criminal activity,
either as an interest acquired or proceeds from racketeering, or as an
interest in an enterprise that engages in racketeering. 51 Section 1963 also
provides that, for purposes of forfeiture, the property interest vests in the
United States at the time of the commission of the crime that gives rise to
forfeiture, thus tying the forfeited asset directly to the crime.52
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2002).
45 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1970).
46 On the other hand, federal district courts may, as a civil penalty, "order[ ] any person
to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; impos[e] reasonable
restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person .... "or order[ ] dissolution
or reorganization of any enterprise .... 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
47 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1).
48 Id. § 1963(a)(2).
49 Id. § 1963(a)(3).
50 Id. § 1963(b).
51 Id. § 1963(a)-(b).
52 See id. § 1963(c).
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3. Money Laundering
The primary statute that deals with the crime of money laundering is
18 U.S.C. § 1956. Money laundering is essentially when a person takes
proceeds from an illegal activity and uses it in a transaction that is de-
signed to either hide the source of the money or avoid a reporting re-
quirement.53 The punishment for money laundering includes civil
penalties equaling the greater of the amount of money involved in the
financial transaction or $10,000. 5 4 Prior to the Patriot Act, § 1956 ap-
plied only to U.S. persons and not to foreign persons or financial institu-
tions. However, other statutes expanded the reach of the U.S.
government, such as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, which
gives in rem jurisdiction for property located in a foreign country to the
district court for the district in which any of the acts leading to the forfei-
ture took place.55 Still, these provisions maintain the traditional nexus
requirement by requiring a link between the property sought and the
crime that gave rise to the forfeiture. 56
B. EFFICACY OF THE PRE-PATRIOT ACT ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS
The government's success in utilizing asset forfeiture as a tool
against domestic crime was not mirrored in the realm of international
crime. There are several problems in dealing with international asset for-
feiture. The first is determining whether a forfeiture statute may be ap-
plied internationally. In making this decision, there are the following
two considerations: first, whether Congress intended the forfeiture statute
to apply extraterritorially, and second, whether applying the statute extra-
territorially would violate principles of international law. 57
Even if a statute may be applied internationally in theory, there are
still some practical difficulties to achieve effective international asset
forfeiture. The United States government cannot simply declare that it
has the authority to pursue assets in a foreign jurisdiction. Some foreign
countries that agree with U.S. policy on combating international crime,
like drug trafficking, give their full cooperation to international asset for-
feiture efforts. However, other countries are not so accommodating.
Even if the U.S. government claims entitlement to assets that reside in a
foreign country, the foreign country may disagree-and the United
States cannot force a foreign sovereign to bow to the United States' dec-
larations of what is binding law.
53 Id. § 1956(a).
54 Id. § 1956(b)(1).
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (2002).
56 See id.
57 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922); United States v. Vasquez-
Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Of course, before U.S. law enforcement agencies can attempt to se-
cure the cooperation of a foreign government, they must first determine
which foreign government to persuade. In addition, some nations' iron-
clad bank secrecy laws can make it difficult to follow assets as they leave
American banks and enter foreign financial institutions. Even if U.S. law
enforcement can follow funds into a particular foreign bank, it may be
difficult to trace the movement of those funds afterward. Thus, while
asset forfeiture has been a useful tool in controlling domestic crime, U.S.
law enforcement has not been so successful in utilizing asset forfeiture
internationally.
C. How THE PATRIOT ACT CHANGES ASSET FORFEITURE AND THE
CURRENT STATE OF ASSET FORFEITURE LAW
The Patriot Act did not cause any significant changes to the civil
drug forfeiture statute 21 U.S.C. § 881. It also did not affect the RICO
statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1963, although it substantially strengthened
various anti-money laundering efforts. 58
The Patriot Act did, however, substantially change the criminal drug
forfeiture statute 21 U.S.C. § 853. Section 853 now allows for the forfei-
ture of "substitute" property. 59 Thus, if a defendant has moved or con-
cealed illicit assets, such as proceeds from an illegal drug transaction,
and those assets would have been subject to forfeiture, the government
may forfeit substitute property in place of the hidden, forfeitable assets.
The government's forfeiture of substitute property is a radical de-
parture from traditional asset forfeiture law as it changes the nexus re-
quirement. Historically, in cases relating to contraband, the only assets a
government could forfeit was the contraband itself, the proceeds from its
sale, or any instrumentality used in creating, selling, or transporting the
contraband. Today, the U.S. government is able to forfeit assets with no
direct connection to the crime. Suppose a pair of business partners or a
married couple-one of whom is engaged in illegal drug transactions and
the other is not-owns their business or marital property jointly. If the
government learns one has engaged in illegal drug transactions and that
person has hidden the transactions' proceeds, it may forfeit her substitute
property. What of the innocent partner who has now lost his business or
car or house?
The Patriot Act also made several important direct and indirect
changes to 18 U.S.C. § 981. Unlike the prior version of § 981, the U.S.
government may now forfeit funds held in a foreign bank account by
forfeiting funds from a corresponding account that the foreign bank has
58 See Crimm, supra note 35, at 1398-99.
59 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (2001).
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in a financial institution in the United States. 60 The funds are deemed to
have been deposited in the U.S. account and the foreign bank is expected
to recover its money by debiting the foreign account.61 Under the previ-
ous version of the statute, the foreign bank could claim an "innocent
owner defense," but it cannot under the new version of § 981 .62 Also,
under the new version of § 981 and under § 984, the U.S. government
does not need to show that the funds it forfeits from the U.S. account are
directly traceable to the criminal proceeds in the foreign account.
63
As a result of these substantial and serious changes, the nexus re-
quirement has become so relaxed that it is virtually nonexistent. Instead
of proving a distinct connection between the crimes giving rise to forfei-
ture and the assets that the government wishes to forfeit, now the govern-
ment needs to show only a connection between a crime and a foreign or
domestic bank. Since U.S. law enforcement may forfeit funds from an
account in the United States in lieu of funds in a foreign account, it is
possible and even likely that innocent U.S. citizens may have funds taken
from them.
Section 981 contains wholly new provisions. It now allows for for-
feiture of proceeds related to offenses against foreign nations for a num-
ber of crimes, including those related to trafficking controlled
substances. 64 Under § 981, forfeiture is now a penalty for certain cur-
rency reporting violations under Title 3165 or for conspiracy to commit
such violations. 66 Section 981 also authorizes the forfeiture of all assets
of any foreign or domestic terrorist group.67 This is another change that
relaxes nexus requirements by allowing the government to forfeit assets
that may be connected to a questionable person, but are not directly con-
nected to a particular crime.
The Patriot Act also effected some dramatic changes on § 981. Sec-
tion 981 authorizes forfeiture of any property used in a transaction in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, which prohibits laundering funds derived
from criminal activity.68 The Patriot Act amended § 1956 by adding
60 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(1)(A) (2002).
61 See id; see also Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorism Financial Enforcement Regimes After September 11, 2001, 22 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 123, 135 (2004).
62 William J. Sweet, Jr., et al., Summary of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 Anti-Money
Laundering Provisions, 1289 P.L.I./Corp. 55, 78 (2002).
63 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 984(a)(1)(A).
64 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).
65 Title 31 is the chapter of the United States Code that deals primarily with money and
finance.
66 See 18 U.S.C. § 371.
67 Id. § 981(a)(1)(G) (Supp. 2002).
68 Id. § 981(a)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000).
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new predicate crimes, new civil penalties, and long-arm jurisdiction. 69
Section 1956 now includes a civil cause of action for money laundering
and makes certain foreign persons, including foreign banks, subject to
forfeiture actions in U.S. federal courts.70 In addition, an amendment
adds new crimes to the predicate offense of money laundering, the pro-
ceeds of which are subject to forfeiture. Section 1956 also includes as
predicate crimes bribery of a public official, smuggling or trafficking
firearms, and acts of terrorism. 71
The Patriot Act changed other aspects of American asset forfeiture
law. The U.S. government may now better assist foreign governments
seeking forfeiture because it is authorized to freeze assets in the United
States that the foreign government seeks to forfeit.72 Section 2467 also
expands domestic forfeiture judgments to include violations of foreign
law that would result in forfeiture if committed under U.S. law73 and
allows foreign nations to forfeit U.S. assets if the foreign nation at-
tempted proper notice, even if the defendant did not receive actual "suffi-
cient" notice.74
Another interesting change prompted by the Patriot Act involves the
requirement that all persons report currency when leaving the United
States. Previously, it was a crime to exit the United States carrying more
than $10,000 in cash without reporting it. 75 This reporting requirement
applied regardless of whether the money had come from illicit or per-
fectly legitimate sources. 76 Originally, there was no innocent owner de-
fense but the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 made the
defense available to persons who did not know her property was being
used in a manner that subjected it to forfeiture, or who took all reasona-
ble steps to prevent that illegal use. 77 However, the Patriot Act removed
that defense because it would have significantly hindered the govern-
ment's ability to control bulk cash flow. 78
Violators of the reporting requirements were previously subject to
penalties, such as fines up to $5,000 under the sentencing guidelines.79
69 See id. § 1956(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(7) (2000).
70 Id. § 1956(b). The conditions upon foreign persons being subject to forfeiture are that
service of process was adequate pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the corre-
sponding rules of the country where the foreign person is found. Id. § 1956(b)(2).
71 Id. § 1956(c)(7).
72 Id. § 2467(b).
73 Id. § 2467(a)(2)(A).
74 Id. § 2467(b).
75 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5316 (2000).
76 See id.
77 Stefan D. Cassella, The Forfeiture of Property Involved in Money Laundering Of-
fenses, 7 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 583, 594 (2004).
78 Id. at 595.
79 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326 (1998).
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The Patriot Act changed the penalty for reporting violations by allowing
the forfeiture of not only the entire amount that one transported or at-
tempted to transport, but also any real and personal property traceable to
such a crime.80 In essence, these measures seem to make the cash itself
contraband, even if it has come from a legitimate source.81
As it may be difficult to keep track of the numerous changes that the
Patriot Act makes to asset forfeiture law in these areas, they are summa-
rized in the following table:
Statute Pre-Patriot Act Post-Patriot Act
21 U.S.C. § 881 Makes subject to civil forfeiture all No change.
illegal drugs; any and all assets
used to make, transport or sell
them; and all proceeds from such
sale.
21 U.S.C. § 853 Allows for criminal forfeiture of Government may forfeit "substi-
assets that are proceeds from ille- tute" property if a defendant has
gal drug transactions; property moved or concealed assets other-
used or intended to be used to wise subject to forfeiture; therefore
facilitate an illegal drug transac- no direct link is required between
tion; or interest in a continuing the property seized and a crime.
criminal enterprise.
18 U.S.C. § 981 Allows forfeiture of foreign drug- Banks may no longer claim inno-
related assets that are found in the cent owner defense, and the gov-
U.S. Banks may claim innocent emment need not prove a link
owner defense. To forfeit funds between forfeited funds and crimi-
from a foreign bank, the govern- nal activity.
ment must show that funds in a
U.S. account are directly traceable
to criminal proceeds in a foreign
account.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 Details organized crime and racke- No change.
teering felonies.
18 U.S.C. § 1963 Authorizes criminal forfeiture of No change.
proceeds from or interests in busi-
nesses operated in violation of
Section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1956 Exempts foreign persons from civil District courts have jurisdiction
forfeiture actions for money laun- over all foreign persons, including
dering crimes in U.S. federal financial institutions, to enforce
courts, actions under this section.
28 U.S.C. § 1355 Grants in rem jurisdiction for No change.
property located in a foreign coun-
try to district court for district in
which any act leading to forfeiture
took place.
80 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. I 2001); Cf. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326
(1998) (holding in a Pre-Patriot case that forfeitures cannot be grossly disproportional to an
offense and thus the forfeiture of the entire $357,144 would be grossly disproportional to the
reporting violation).
81 See Roger Pilon, First Thoughts on the New Money Laundering Act, 29 HUM. RTS. 20,
21 (Winter 2002).
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Statute Pre-Patriot Act Post-Patriot Act
18 U.S.C. § 984 Nonexistent. The government need not prove
specific link between the property
and the crime that gives rise to
civil forfeiture.
31 U.S.C. § 5317 Failure to report transport of more The act of transporting bulk cash
than $10,000 cash out of the coun- is itself a crime and subject to for-
try is a reporting violation subject feiture of the whole amount.
to a maximum fine of $5,000 but
not subject to confiscation of the
entire cash amount.
8 2
The Patriot Act's most obvious and recurring changes involve the
change of foreign persons' rights, especially foreign banks, and the near-
elimination of the traditional nexus requirement.
D. To WHAT CRIMES THE PATRIOT ACT FORFEITURE APPLIES
The Patriot Act undoubtedly applies to organized crime and money
laundering.83 However, whether the provisions of the Patriot Act can be
used as a tool against foreign drug traffickers is another matter. Foreign
drug cartels and traffickers may fall under the ambit of the Patriot Act in
one of two ways: either through provisions containing language specifi-
cally implicating foreign persons or trafficking in controlled substances,
or through the more generic and almost universally applicable provisions
against terrorism.
Several of the changes to §§ 981 and 1956 will be facially applica-
ble to foreign drug cartels. For example, when an individual deposits
illicit funds into a foreign bank account, § 981 allows the government to
confiscate funds from the foreign bank if the bank has an interbank ac-
count in the United States even if the individual does not have a U.S.
bank account. 84 There is no language limiting the use of this provision
against terrorist activities so there is no reason why it may not be applied
to foreign drug cartels. Section 1956 also extends civil forfeiture juris-
diction of foreign individuals and banks to domestic federal courts, 85 and
since that provision is not limited to any particular predicate crime, it
may presumably be used against foreign drug cartels.
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 981, which allows for the forfeiture of
assets for drug trafficking offenses committed against a foreign state,
specifically allows its use against foreign drug cartels, 86 as does the lan-
guage of § 853 of Title 21. Title 21 encompasses violations involving
82 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326 (1998).
83 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 302, 115 Stat. 272, 296-98 (2001).
84 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(I)(A).
85 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2).
86 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (2000).
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controlled substances and does not limit itself to domestic transactions. 87
Portions of the Patriot Act may also be used against foreign drug cartels
when foreign governments pursue drug trafficking assets for forfeiture in
the United States.88 Because the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 981
and 21 U.S.C. § 843 specifically mention either foreign individuals or
drug trafficking, both seem to apply to foreign drug cartels.
What is more difficult is determining whether the many other Pa-
triot Act provisions which are labeled as applying to terrorists and terror-
ist activities also apply to the trafficking activities of foreign drug cartels.
This is an important question because the asset forfeiture provisions dis-
cussed above depend on a criminal defendant committing specific acts-
the proceeds or instrumentalities of which may later be forfeited to the
government-thus limiting the assets that are subject to forfeiture to
those traceable to the particular crime which the government prosecutes.
However, the revised version of 18 U.S.C. § 981 allows the government
to forfeit all assets of any individual or organization engaged in planning
or perpetrating any act of terrorism against the United States.8 9 This is
an important distinction because it allows the government to confiscate
and forfeit any assets in the possession of such individuals or organiza-
tions, regardless of whether the government can connect it as either pro-
ceeds from or an instrumentality in furtherance of a particular activity.
This is again a departure from the traditional asset forfeiture doctrine; the
nexus requirement is again relaxed so that a connection is not required
between an asset and a crime but simply between an individual and a
crime.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines terrorism for the purposes of § 981.
Section 2331 lays out a three-prong definition for international terrorism
which is: (1) activities that involve violent acts or acts that are dangerous
to human life and are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States; (2) acts intended to either coerce the civilian population, influ-
ence government policy through coercion, or affect governmental con-
duct by assassination or kidnapping; and (3) acts that occur primarily
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend na-
tional boundaries by means through which they are accomplished. 90
Drug trafficking easily meets the first and third prongs of this defi-
nition. Drug trafficking involves a large component of activities done
outside of the United States and transcends national boundaries since the
majority of drugs in the United States comes from foreign sources. In
87 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(l)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 2467(a), (b).
89 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G).
90 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2000). There are cases pending in the federal courts challenging
the constitutionality of this determination.
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addition, illegal drugs themselves are arguably dangerous to human life
since use of many illegal drugs-cocaine, heroine, amphetamines, etc.-
often lead to death, such as from overdose, driving while intoxicated, or
suicide. Drug trafficking, in addition to violating U.S. laws, is itself ar-
guably dangerous to human life, such as when rival gangs shoot each
other on the street, human mules die when the bags they carry burst in
their stomachs, police are sometimes killed in the line of duty, and are
sometimes forced to kill dealers.
The step on which the application of this definition to drug cartels
stumbles is the intent-to-coerce prong. On one hand, it might seem likely
that the intent of the cartels is to sell drugs and make money and there-
fore their activities are not intended to coerce civilians or influence gov-
ernmental policy and conduct. On the other hand, the cartels probably
have used tactics on independent occasions to persuade governmental
policy and conduct, such as bribery or intimidation of public or govern-
ment officials. Furthermore, many people have reported the coercive
pressure by neighborhood dealers to buy and use drugs, especially in
inner cities. Thus, there is also a reasonable argument that the activities
of drug cartels are in fact intended to coerce civilians into buying and
using drugs and influence governments into allowing such pressure.
E. WHETHER THE PATRIOT ACT CAN OR SHOULD ACHIEVE ITS GOAL
IN IMPROVING EFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL ASSET
FORFEITURE
Assuming arguendo that the asset forfeiture provisions of the Pa-
triot Act discussed above may be used in the international criminal syn-
dicate settings already discussed, the next question is whether the
changes in the Patriot Act can or should achieve what they set out to do,
namely, to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. government in pursuing
the forfeiture of international assets from both domestic and international
criminal activities. This breaks down into two sub-questions: whether
the Patriot Act's provisions can help the government's cause in theory;
and whether the changes will have any practical effect. It will be clear
that although some of the Patriot Act provisions will make it easier for
the U.S. government to obtain assets that it could not have forfeited
before, it will not make the advances that its drafters purport. Because of
legal and practical problems, the Patriot Act goes too far, but at the same
time it cannot ever go far enough.
1. How the Patriot Act "Improves" Asset Forfeiture
Many of the provisions discussed above, when applied in the inter-
national setting, will certainly have the potential to be helpful for the
U.S. government. For example, the changes to § 981 have not only al-
IF IT WEREN'T FOR THE FLIP SIDE
lowed the U.S. government to forfeit funds that were deposited domesti-
cally, it also granted the government a very low standard to meet to
forfeit the domestic funds. In addition, the government need not prove a
link between the assets it seeks to forfeit and the allegedly criminal funds
that were deposited in another country.91 The bank account from which
the government will forfeit funds need not be connected to the criminal
defendant directly, but only to the foreign bank, which may no longer
claim an innocent owner defense to prohibit the government from forfeit-
ing its funds.92 These changes will undoubtedly make it easier for the
U.S. government to forfeit assets from drug-trafficking foreign cartels.
The changes to other statutes in the Patriot Act will also be useful to
the U.S. government. The Patriot Act contains several long-arm jurisdic-
tion provisions, which expand the reach of federal courts to include do-
mestic assets of foreign nationals. 93 The U.S. government now has more
latitude in helping foreign governments forfeit drug-related assets by
honoring more foreign judgments and issuing restraining orders to freeze
assets pursuant to such judgments, whether the possessor of the assets is
a citizen or a foreign national, and even if service on the defendant was
imperfect. 94 The U.S. government can forfeit assets that are unrelated to
criminal activities if the possessor has hidden his illicit assets from the
government.95 For groups or individuals engaging in activities that fit
the definition of terrorism, even if those activities are not ones that are
historically thought of as terrorist activities, the government can force
forfeiture of all of their assets without needing to prove any connection
between the assets and the crime. 96 This is a radical departure from es-
tablished asset forfeiture law. The changes in the Patriot Act allow the
U.S. government to have a broader reach in pursuing and a lower stan-
dard in effecting asset forfeiture.
2. Practical Problems
So why are the changes not enough to turn the tide for the U.S. in
the war on international crime? There are practical problems with the
real-world application of the statutes that make the Patriot Act fall short
of its goals. For example, the statutes are still unable to address the two
most troublesome problems associated with international asset forfeiture:
following the money and securing international cooperation. All of the
provisions discussed above will indeed be helpful to the government, but
91 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(2).
92 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(1)(A).
93 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b).
94 See 28 U.S.C. § 2467(b).
95 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).
96 See id.
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only after the government has located the assets it wants to forfeit. Most
of the revenue from selling drugs in the United States ends up in foreign
bank accounts. If the assets stay here, it is easy for the U.S. government
to find and forfeit them; while some assets are found here, most are not.
Criminals move through countries quickly; even when U.S. law enforce-
ment is able to track them or their money, it is often at a much slower
rate than the criminals can act.97
The problem then is one of practicality and international coopera-
tion. 98 There are numerous mutual-assistance treaties in place with other
nations for the purpose of combating the illegal drug trade, but they do
not include the countries that are truly needed. There are bank secrecy
laws to contend with in foreign jurisdictions as well. These are the
problems that the Patriot Act still leaves unaddressed. These are very
difficult issues because, while the U.S. government may know that it
needs international cooperation to combat the war on drugs with asset
forfeiture, it cannot force that cooperation.
Another of the practical difficulties in real-world implementation of
these new asset forfeiture rules is the question of who will actually be
hurt by the measures. The measures are intended to be remedial 99 and to
be directed against criminals, specifically terrorists. However, it is thor-
oughly plausible that these measures will turn out to be punitive rather
than remedial, and will harm unintended innocents. Several such possi-
ble situations have already been discussed above in Part C. Since the
U.S. government in many instances no longer needs to prove a connec-
tion between a crime leading to forfeiture and the assets that the govern-
ment wants to forfeit, there also may be economic repercussions both to
individuals and to banking companies due to the new rules affecting
banks.
As discussed above, the Patriot Act allows the U.S. government to
forfeit funds from an account at a bank here in the United States in lieu
of assets that the government knows have been deposited into a foreign
account held by the same, that would be forfeitable if they had in fact
been deposited in the domestic account.' 00 The idea is that the foreign
bank will debit the money that had been seized from the appropriate for-
eign account and that eventually the bank will be discouraged from en-
gaging in shady financial transactions and taking proceeds from illicit
97 See Stefan D. Cassella, Bulk Cash Smuggling and the Globalization of Crime: Over-
coming Constitutional Challenges to Forfeiture Under 31 U.S.C. § 5332, 22 BERKLEY J. INT'L
L. 98, 98-99 (2004).
98 See generally Stefan D. Cassella, Money Laundering Has Gone Global: It's Time to
Update the Federal Laws, 49-JAN FED. LAW. 25 (2002).
99 See Pilon, supra note 81, at 21.
100 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(1)(A).
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activities.' 0 But if this cost becomes too great for the foreign banks to
bear, they may choose to reduce or even withdraw their business from
our shores.
Furthermore, the Patriot Act greatly expands domestic jurisdiction
over foreign nationals. 102 Between the strict new measures, new crimes,
relaxed nexus requirements, and expanded jurisdiction over foreign citi-
zens, it is possible that enforcement of the Patriot Act provisions will
discourage foreigners from traveling to the United States. If that were to
happen, it would certainly be harmful to the American economy.
Furthermore, the new Patriot Act provisions place an impossible
burden on innocent owners. They are forced to prove a negative, that is,
their property was not involved in criminal activity. 10 3 While it is un-
likely the drafters of the Patriot Act intended to make things so difficult
for innocent owners, it is certainly a probable repercussion that will re-
sult from the Patriot Act's draconian measures.
3. Legal/Theoretical Consequences
The Patriot Act falls short of its goal beyond the practical problems
of applying it in the real world. Application of the new asset forfeiture
provisions under the Patriot Act raises important constitutional questions.
The reduction of the nexus requirement and the invasion on the rights of
foreign nationals and foreign banks will present substantial legal
problems in enforcing these provisions of the Patriot Act.
The first potential challenge to the constitutionality of these provi-
sions of the Patriot Act is a disproportionality argument. The new rules
under the Patriot Act that allow for forfeiture of "bulk cash smuggling,"
i.e., transporting currency outside of the United States without reporting
it, could lead to ridiculous results. For example, under the old rules,
someone trying to transport $3,000,000 cash outside of the U.S. could
only be fined up to a statutory maximum, such as the $5,000 statutory
fine in United States v. Bajakajian, for failure to report the currency.
The full sum could only be forfeited if it was later proven that the money
came from illicit sources. Now, the government may take the entire
$3,000,000 at the outset, even if the money is completely untainted.
The Supreme Court faced this issue in United States v. Bajakajian, a
pre-Patriot Act case where the defendant attempted to carry $357,144 of
legally-obtained money outside of the United States without reporting
it. 1 4 U.S. Customs attempted to forfeit the entire amount, and the Su-
preme Court found for the defendant, citing the Eighth Amendment to
101 See also Sweet, et al., supra note 62, at 78-79.
102 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b).
103 See Crimm, supra note 35, at 1394.
104 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998)
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the United States Constitution and its prohibition of the imposition of
excessive fines. The Court held that the forfeiture of the entire amount
was punitive rather than remedial. 10 5 The Court further held that it was
invalid because the fine was grossly disproportional to the conduct. 10 6
One might argue, flimsily, that the Patriot Act is different because it
now makes the smuggling of bulk cash itself a crime, rather than the
failure to report, which was the crime in Bajakajian. The Patriot Act's
provisions against bulk cash smuggling apply to money that comes from
perfectly legal sources in addition to illicit sources, so the businessman
who carries $3,000,000 can lose it if he does not report it. Thus, it seems
the Patriot Act is a thinly-veiled attempt to heighten the punishment for
failing to report transport of currency and get around the Court's decision
in Bajakajian.10 7 The new Patriot Act provisions will cause some pun-
ishments that are grossly disproportional to the conduct they are assigned
to, and thus may run afoul of the Eighth Amendment.
But there are other constitutional questions raised by the new asset
forfeiture laws under the Patriot Act. Several litigants have already chal-
lenged the wording of some Patriot Act provisions on constitutional
grounds. In particular, the notion of providing "material support" to ter-
rorists has been attacked as overbroad and unconstitutionally vague.108
However, these challenges have not yet been successful. " 9
As discussed in Part C, many of the new provisions of the Patriot
Act relax the traditional nexus requirement. Traditionally, for the gov-
ernment to forfeit an asset, whether it was real or personal, tangible or
intangible, the government had to prove that a connection existed be-
tween the crime leading to the forfeiture and the asset to be forfeited.
Typically, the asset would be either an instrumentality used in the com-
mission of, proceeds from, or purchased with the proceeds from, an ille-
gal act. Under the new provisions of the Patriot Act, in many instances
the government need not prove a connection between the asset and the
crime leading to forfeiture. 110 In addition, the burden of proof shifts
from obliging the government to prove that the assets came from an il-
licit source to requiring the defendant to prove that the assets came from
an innocent source."i ' There are also new anti-bulk cash smuggling
105 Id. at 328.
106 Id. at 339.
107 See Pilon, supra note 81, at 22.
108 See Crimm, supra note 35, at 1408.
109 Id. at 1412-14.
110 See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (allowing for the forfeiture of funds deposited in U.S. accounts in
lieu of illicit funds deposited in foreign account held by same bank without proving connection
between the forfeited domestic funds and the illegal activity); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (allowing the
forfeiture of "substitute property").
111 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G); Stefan D. Cassella, Forfeiture of Terrorist Assets Under
the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 7, 9-10 (2002).
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laws, which render illicit perfectly legal funds once taken out of the
U.S.-which become perfectly innocent again once they hit the govern-
ment's coffers. 112
Rather than serving any remedial or punitive purpose, the relaxed
nexus requirements of the Patriot Act seem geared to gain as much
money for the U.S. government as possible. If the government need not
prove a link between the crime and the asset to be forfeited, serious Due
Process issues may arise. Even if the government's purpose has always
been to gain as much assets from criminals as possible to increase its
revenues, under the previous statutes there were still legitimate justifica-
tions to forfeit property: The government could forfeit the proceeds from
criminal activity and assets bought with those proceeds because the crim-
inal had no legal right of ownership or possession to assets coming from
illegal sources.
However, the same cannot be said for some of the Patriot Act provi-
sions. The Patriot Act allows for forfeiture of substitute property 113 in a
blatant effort to garner as much revenue for the U.S. government as pos-
sible. Consider the ramifications of this statute: a stockbroker has taken
to driving around town on his lunch hour and selling drugs to his co-
workers out of his Mercedes. Law enforcement authorities learn of this
and decide to take action against him, including forfeiting the Mercedes
(which they are entitled to do as it was property used in the facilitation of
a felony 1 14). Unfortunately, the stockbroker crashes his Mercedes before
the authorities come to arrest him and confiscate the car. Under the Pa-
triot Act, the authorities may now confiscate any other piece of the stock-
broker's property since the Mercedes that was subject to forfeiture has
substantially diminished in value.' 
15
At first, this substitution of property might seem trivial, but upon
further reflection it is hard to justify on any grounds other than the gov-
ernment's greed. The Mercedes itself is subject to forfeiture because it
was used in the commission of a felony, and that is the only reason it is
subject to forfeiture. Once it has been wrecked it is no longer of any use
to the stockbroker and so will no longer further his criminal activities.
The government could still easily forfeit the Mercedes out of principle.
Instead, the government will seek to forfeit another piece of property
belonging to the stockbroker to make up for the diminished value of the
Mercedes. What is the justification for forfeiting substitute property?
How can the grounds for forfeiting the Mercedes, i.e., its involvement in
a crime, be extended or transferred to another piece of property not used
112 See Pilon, supra note 81, at 21.
113 See 21 U.S.C. § 85 3 (p).
114 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2).
115 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1)(d).
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in the crime? What if the only other valuable asset belonging to the
stockbroker is his house? Can the government choose to seize it, sell it,
keep the amount equivalent to the value of the Mercedes and give the
remainder to the stockbroker's family now that they have been displaced
and their home taken from them? Taking a piece of property that was
not involved in a crime, where the reason for forfeiture is a piece of
property's involvement in a crime is unconstitutional because it is either
a deprivation of property without due process of law, 116 or a taking with-
out just compensation.1 17
CONCLUSION
The Patriot Act has indeed given a facelift to American asset forfei-
ture legislation.1 8 On its face, the law of asset forfeiture looks radically
different-lowered nexus requirements between asset and crime, lower
burdens of proof for the government, and less respect for the rights of
foreign nationals. Underneath, however, the same practical problems re-
main-it is difficult for the U.S. government officials to track assets
outside of the United States, and even when they are able to do so, they
cannot force international cooperation in pursuit of those assets. Further-
more, the possibility that enforcement of certain Patriot Act provisions
violate the Fifth and Eighth Amendment militates against its application.
The problem of how to better equip American law enforcement agencies
to pursue forfeiture of drug trafficking assets, money laundering assets,
and terrorist funding, without trampling on the rights of citizens, remains
unsolved.
116 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
117 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118 See George A. Lyden, The International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Ter-
rorist Financing Act of 2001: Congress Wears a Blindfold While Giving Money Laundering
Legislation a Facelift, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 201 (2003).
